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Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2003) report that audit industry fee premia primarily reside 
with joint national and city-specific industry leadership as opposed to merely firm-wide 
(national) industry expertise, suggesting auditor choice among the Big 5 is best 
conceptualized on joint industry specialization in city-specific markets and nationally. 
This study examines whether the prior results could be confounded by the presence of 
city-specific overall market leadership effects. Our findings reaffirm that joint local and 
national auditor industry expertise is valued by audit clients. Further, overall city-specific 
leadership, by itself, also matters in fee determination and results in higher fees, though at 
a slightly weaker level of statistical significance.  
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Prior economics of auditing literature has documented the existence of fee 
premiums paid to Big 8/6/5 industry specialists, in addition to premiums attributable to 
the generic brand name of the Big 8/6/5. Such studies include Palmrose 1986, Craswell, 
Francis and Talyor (1995); DeFond Francis and Wong (2000); Ferguson and Stokes 
2002, and Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2003) [hereafter FFS]. The most recent of these 
studies, FFS, finds evidence for the existence of joint national and city-specific industry 
leader premiums. In investigating aspects of city-specific industry leadership, FFS 
develop the city-level line of inquiry first suggested by Francis, Stokes and Anderson 
(1999) [hereafter FSA].  
This study continues the city-level line of inquiry. Since FFS focus solely on joint 
industry leadership effects, we investigate the possibility that their results might be 
sensitive to different characterizations of ‘leadership’ consistent with FSA’s alternative 
conceptualizations. FSA characterize city-level leadership two ways: either (a) city-level 
market leadership, or (b) city-level industry leadership and pose the following questions:  
 
‘Do city-level market leaders command the same kind of fee premiums that have 
been found using national data? Is there a premium for city-level industry leaders?’1 
 
The second question is addressed by FFS, who document the strength of 
premiums for joint city-specific and national industry leaders vis-à-vis purely national 
effects. In this study, we test if the results reported by FFS (that industry expertise is the 
                                                          
1 FSA. p. 187.  
joint result of both national and city-specific leadership) could in fact be driven by overall 
city leadership (a proxy for overall city reputations). In other words, is the “city” 
component of the joint national/city leadership that we document in Model 3 Table 3 in 
FFS confounded by overall city leadership (a proxy for overall city reputations)?2  
This question is interesting considering descriptive statistics on the overlap 
between city-specific industry leadership and overall city market leadership. For the full 
sample of Big 5 firm audited clients in 1998 in the FFS sample, and described further in 
Table 1 below, 24% are audited by the overall city leader (CITYLEAD), whilst 36% of 
observations are audited by the city-specific industry leader (INDLEAD). Interestingly 
35% of the audits by city-specific industry leaders reported in FFS are undertaken by an 
auditor who is both the city-specific industry leader and the overall city market leader (or 
combined leaders (COMBLEAD)). The pattern of overlap between the two leadership 
characterizations is shown in Table 1 and is consistent across cities, with a range from 
22.7% to 54.7%, and averages 35.2% for the full sample. This suggests the reported joint 
national and city-specific industry specialist premiums in FFS could be confounded by 
overall city-specific market leadership.  
  
   [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
2.0 Theoretical background and hypothesis 
 
There are a number of reasons why auditors could seek to hold positions of 
market leadership. Extant research documents a positive association between market 
                                                          
2 Note that we reproduce Model 3 from Table 3 in FFS in Table 2 of this paper for ease of comparison.  
share and profitability. Syzmanski, Bharadwaj and Varadarajan (1993) perform a meta-
analysis on forty-eight studies investigating the market share and profitability 
relationship. They find that on average, market share has a positive effect on profitability. 
A related stream of research supports the notion that early entrants in new markets often 
achieve a first-mover advantage which results in dominant market shares and a 
sustainable competitive advantage through the creation of entry barriers (Kerin, 
Varadarajan and Peterson (1992); Szymanski (1995)).3 
Second, there are also a number of studies which point to supply side signaling 
benefits of high market share. Market leadership signals product quality, which enables 
market leaders to charge higher prices. Higher prices in turn provide a further signal of 
product quality (Scitovsky 1945). Shapiro (1983a) demonstrates analytically that higher 
prices for high quality experience goods are a mechanism to ensure the high quality of 
such goods by making it costly to shirk on quality. Shapiro (1983b) further demonstrates 
that higher prices for these goods represent normal returns to reputation (quality) 
investments.   
We suggest consumers use market share data to make inferences about product 
quality. For example, Smallwood and Conlisk (1979) and Caminal and Vines (1996) 
demonstrate analytically that market share provides a positive signal of product quality 
when quality is uncertain. Hellofs and Jacobson (1999) report survey and experimental 
evidence that market share is positively associated with perceived product quality for 
“premium” brands and for products where “exclusivity” is not a concern.4  
                                                          
3 Frank and Cook (1995) argue more generally that many markets have become winner-take-all lotteries. In 
such markets, there are economic rents to be gained by firms that achieve market dominance.  
4 Premium brands refer to products having higher prices, and exclusivity is associated with status goods 
whose distribution must be restricted to retain their aura of exclusivity. The audits provided by Big 5 
Thus the marketing literature documents the ability of suppliers who hold large 
market shares to generate positive reputation effects and perceived value amongst buyers. 
Large city-level market share is also likely to be valued in audit markets. For example, 
the city-level analysis conducted in FSA using US data to analyze the 1989 audit firm 
mergers indicates that the merger between Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young forming 
Ernst & Young was: 
 
‘More of a leadership merger, in which the primary effect was to significantly 
increase market share in cities in which the pre-merger firms already operated, resulting 
in a substantial increase in market leadership (cities with top ranking).’5 
 
The implication was that Ernst & Young strategically increased the number of 
city-specific overall market leadership positions, and that such positions provided 
perceived product quality signaling and/or profitability benefits.  
On the demand side, if product signaling benefits apply in audit markets, the 
client would regard a city-specific market leader as possessing those attributes the client 
associates with high quality audits. Demand for overall city-specific market leaders 
would arise from perceptions that these suppliers offered a superior product, consistent 
with FSA’s assertion that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
accounting firms are accurately characterized by these two conditions. Product quality is uncertain in 
auditing, and Craswell and Francis (1999) characterize audits as experience goods whose quality can only 
be assessed through experience (Nelson 1970; Wilde 1981).  
5 FSA. p. 187 
‘Market share is important because it measures leadership from which inferences 
can be made about auditor reputations and expertise.’6 
 
In summary, supply side benefits of overall city market leadership are based 
around both profitability and product signaling benefits. On the demand side, buyers 
perceive that city market leaders can provide superior product quality. This study seeks to 
establish whether the previously reported premiums for joint national and city-specific 
industry leadership might be impacted by the presence of buyers of audit services who 
are willing to pay higher prices for overall city-specific leadership.  
 
3.0 Empirical tests 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
 
We utilize the same data set as FFS, which comprises the full sample of 
Australian listed companies in 1998. It is noted that consistent with FFS, companies with 
non-fiscal year ends (i.e., firms having a reporting period greater than or less than 12 






                                                          
6 FSA. p. 186 
3.2 Measurement of variables 
 
The model used is a logical extension of that used in FFS, testing for joint 
national and local industry leadership as well as overall city leadership effects. We 
specify the OLS regression model as follows: 
 
LAF = b0 + b1 LTA + b2 LSUB + b3 CATA + b4 QUICK + b5DE + b6ROI + 
b7FOREIGN + b8 OPINION + b9YE + b10 LOSS + b11 NATIND + b12 NATOVER + 
b13NATALONE + b14 INDNOTNAT + b15 OVERNOTNAT + e         
 
where: 
LAF     = natural log of audit fees, 
LTA       = natural log of total assets, 
LSUB     = natural log of the number of subsidiaries, 
CATA     = ratio of current assets to total assets, 
QUICK    = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities, 
DE     = ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
ROI     = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets, 
FOREIGN  = proportion of subsidiaries that represent foreign operations, 
OPINION  = indicator variable, 1 = qualified audit report, 
YE   = indicator variable, 1 = non-June 30th year end, 




NATIND = indicator variable, 1= national industry #1 or #2 and city-specific 
industry leader (but not overall city leader), 
NATOVER = indicator variable, 1= national industry #1 or #2 and overall city 
leader (but not city-specific industry leader), 
NATALONE   =indicator variable, 1=national industry #1 or #2 (but not either 
city-specific industry leader or overall city leader), 
INDNOTNAT  =indicator variable, 1=city-specific industry leader alone (but not 
overall city leader and not national industry #1 or #2) 
OVERNOTNAT =indicator variable, 1=overall city leader alone (but not city 
industry leader and not national industry #1 or #2)       
e    = error term assumed to have normal OLS regression properties. 
 
The first ten control variables are the standard audit fee control variables and are 
discussed in further detail in FFS pages 438-9. The first test variable, NATIND (n=115) 
picks up the joint effect of national industry leadership (#1 or #2) and the city-specific 
industry leader who is not an overall city leader. This variable thus removes the potential 
confounding effects of overall city-specific leadership from the FFS Model 3 test 
variable.7 The second test variable, NATOVER (n=23) tests the joint effect of national 
industry leadership (#1 or #2) and the overall city leader who is not a city-specific 
industry leader. This test variable controls for joint national and overall city-specific 
market leadership after excluding potentially confounding city-specific industry 
leadership effects. If joint national industry and local market leadership matters, we 
would observe a significant positive co-efficient on this indicator, after controlling for 
other effects. NATALONE (n=163) is the third test variable which seeks to isolate the 
impact of purely national industry leadership excluding city-specific industry leaders and 
overall city leaders. The fourth test variable INDNOTNAT (n=45) tests for fee premiums 
for the city-specific industry leader who is not the overall city leader or a national 
industry leader. This variable picks up pure city-specific industry leadership after 
removing any national industry leadership and any local market leadership impact. Last, 
OVERNOTNAT (n=53), indicates overall city leaders alone who are not city-specific 
industry leaders or national industry leaders. This indicator variable identifies the impact 
of pure local market leaders excluding national industry and local industry effects. If 
                                                          
7 The model specification is similar to FFS, and we focus on outright leadership at the local level owing to 
the insignificance of second ranked industry leaders in Model 2 of Table 3 in FFS. In addition, Panel A of 
Table 1 in FFS (p. 435) documents a sizeable market share ‘gap’ of 12 percentage points or greater for 4 
out of 5 cities. This indicates that the focus of this study on the overall city #1 is not likely to be impaired 
by overall #2 competitors who are ‘close’ to the leader in terms of market share.  
overall city-level market leadership matters, irrespective of joint national industry effects, 




4.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
Appropriate sample descriptive statistics are found in Table 2 of FFS, and 
discussed on pages 439-440 therein. 
 
4.2 Multivariate tests 
 
Table 2 reports the results for the model based on the OLS regression described 
previously. The results indicate the model has an F - statistic of 182.18 significant at 
p<.000, and generates an adjusted R2 of .80. In terms of test variables, NATIND is 
significant at conventional levels with a co-efficient of .171 significant at p<.02. This 
indicates that joint national industry leading city-specific industry leaders who are not 
overall city leaders generate fee premiums in the order of 19%.8 This result reaffirms 
reported results in FFS. The joint national and city-level industry premiums are not 
compromised by the exclusion of overall city leadership effects.  
Of the remaining test variables, NATOVER, NATALONE, and INDNOTNAT 
are not significant at conventional levels. However, OVERNOTNAT has a coefficient of 
                                                          
8 The procedure documented in Simon and Francis (1988) calculates the percentage effect of the intercept 
shift on the dependent variable and is defined as ez – 1, where in this case z is the parameter value for 
auditors being joint national industry leading city-specific industry leaders who are not overall city leaders.  
.17 and is significant at p=.078 two-tailed. Whilst the result is not as strong as that for 
NATIND, it implies that fee premiums accrue to purely overall city-level leaders, and 
that these premiums are of a similar magnitude to the joint national and city-specific 
industry leader premium.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
4.3 Sensitivity tests 
 
 These results are robust to a number of differing model specifications and 
sensitivity tests utilized in FFS.9 For example we rerun the analysis excluding clients in 
each individual ASX industry, one at a time, with the results being similar to those 
reported in Table 2. We then eliminate industry codes (21-22) comprising ‘miscellaneous 
industries’, and the results are also unchanged. The clients in the two smallest markets – 
Adelaide and Brisbane, are then removed to examine the sensitivity of results to 
exclusion of the two smallest cities. When this is done, the co-efficient on NATIND is 
.224 (p=.006), and the co-efficient on OVERNOTNAT is .194 (p=.067). All other test 
variable co-efficients remain insignificant.10 Thus reported results do not appear sensitive 
to inclusion or exclusion of the two smaller cities. We also run a similar analysis 
examining the effect of client size on the joint national and city-specific industry 
                                                          
9 Examination of variance inflation factors (VIF’s) indicate that most VIF’s are less than 2, indicating that 
consistent with Lardaro (1993), multi-colinearity is not likely to be a concern.  
10 Another sensitivity test involves the removal of the largest audit firm nationally, KPMG. Excluding 
KPMG makes no difference to the strength of the industry leadership co-efficient.  
leadership premium. Consistent with FFS, the size interaction term is positive and 
significant at p<.047.   
As a further sensitivity, we look at whether the overall city-specific leadership fee 
premium extends to an overall national market leadership fee premium effect. Table 1 in 
FFS indicates the national market leader, KPMG holds 28% market share, whilst 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the second ranked firm nationally holds a 24% market share. Is 
there a national market leadership effect or a combined national #1 and #2 given these 
two auditors hold nearly 52% market share? To test this, we re-run the primary regression 
model reported in Table 2 including firstly an indicator variable for KPMG, the dominant 
firm in terms of fees nationally. The result of this additional test indicates no support for 
the assertion that overall national market leadership fee premiums exist. The coefficient 
on the joint national and local industry indicator variable NATIND remains at .17, whilst 
the coefficient on OVERNOTNAT also remains unchanged at .17. In both cases 
significance levels for these two indicators remain as before. Next we include a dummy 
for both KPMG and PWC, the national #1 and #2. Once again the results are similar, as 
with further tests documented in footnote 11.11 In sum, overall market leadership, 
measured nationally, does not attract fee premiums whilst locally it does.  
 
4.4 Re-examination of the Big 5 Premium 
 
The results in this study pose one last question. Do Big 5 accounting firms that are 
not joint national and city-specific industry leaders earn a premium over non-Big 5 firms? 
                                                          
11 We also create two additional test variables indicating: a) national market leaders who are not overall 
local market leaders or national industry #1 or #2, and b) national market leading #1and #2 who are not 
overall local market leaders or national industry #1 or #2. These additional tests do not alter the results 
reported in Table 2. 
Is it possible that the Big 8/6/5 premium identified in prior audit research, and based on 
firm-wide data, could be confounded by the failure to consider the effects of joint 
national and city-specific industry leadership? We drop all Big 5 observations coded 1 for 
NATIND in the sample. The reduced sample is 931 firms comprising 566 Big 5 clients 
and 365 audited by other auditors. The Big 5 parameter estimate is 0.20, and the t-statistic 
of 4.35 is significant at p<.01. A parameter value of 0.20 indicates an average Big Five 
premium of 22%. We conclude there is a general Big 5 brand name audit fee premium 
that is separate and distinct from the effects of joint national and city-specific industry 
leadership by Big 5 audit firms.   
 
5.0 Summary and conclusions 
  
The objective of this study was to further the city-level line of inquiry initiated by 
FSA, and to investigate whether the primary results reported in FFS are sensitive to the 
differing definitions or characterization of ‘leadership’ documented in FSA. FFS report 
that audit industry fee premiums primarily reside with joint national and local office 
industry leaders. We test whether city-specific market leadership provides a positive 
signal of audit quality and a basis for charging higher audit fees after controlling for 
industry leadership effects nationally and at the city-level.  
Our results indicate the key auditor characteristic determinant of audit fee 
premiums appears to be joint national and local industry leadership. This evidence 
reaffirms that results reported in FFS are robust to inclusion of alternate leadership 
definitions. In addition, we find evidence of a city-specific overall market leadership 
premium at a comparable magnitude to city-specific industry leadership, although the 
significance level is somewhat weaker. Together, these two findings highlight the 
importance of auditor reputation as a city-specific industry leader and overall city-
specific market leader in differentiating amongst auditors in audit markets. Last, we note 
the Big 5 premium widely documented in the economics of auditing literature does not 
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Table 1       
Numbers (Percentages) of clients held by each leadership characterization across cities. 
       
City Perth Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Nationally 
       
Total Big 5 Sample 186 (27.3%) 264 (38.8%) 137 (20.1%) 64 (9.4%) 30 (4.4%) 681 (100%) 
#, % INDLEAD 64 (34.4%) 85 (32.2%) 44 (32.1%) 32 (50%) 22 (73.3%) 247 (36.3%) 
#, % CITYLEAD 49 (26.3%) 52 (19.7%) 29 (21.1%) 22 (34.4%) 9 (30%) 161 (23.6%) 
#, % COMBLEAD 35 (18.8%) 22 (8.3%) 10 (7.3%) 13 (20.3%) 7 (23.3%) 87 (12.8%) 
#COMBLEAD of #CITYLEAD (%) 54.7% 25.9% 22.7% 40.1% 31.8% 35.2% 
Where:       
INDLEAD = City-specific industry leader     
CITYLEAD = City-specific market leader     



















Audit Fee Regression Models (dependent variable is natural log of audit fees) 
   FFS Combined Model 3 Overall Market Interaction Test 
Control Variables: 
Exp. 
Sign Estimate t-value Prob* Estimate t-value Prob*  
Intercept  -1.45 -7.63 0.001 -1.54 -8.02 0.001 
LTA + 0.46 30.84 0.001 0.47 31.55 0.001 
LSUB + 0.05 9.09 0.001 0.05 8.97 0.001 
CATA + 0.93 8.81 0.001 0.93 8.71 0.001 
Quick  - -0.03 -5.12 0.001 -0.03 -4.95 0.001 
DE  +  0.79 4.38 0.001 0.76 4.19 0.001 
ROI  -  -0.46 -4.45 0.001 -0.46 -4.46 0.001 
Foreign  + 0.69 6.6 0.001 0.7 6.73 0.001 
Opinion  + 0.01 0.15 0.885 0.01 0.01 0.996 
YE  -  0.01 0.18 0.857 0.02 0.35 0.725 
Loss  -  0.01 0.02 0.984 -0.01 -0.12 0.901 
       
Experimental Variables:       
National #1 or #2, and city #1  0.213 3.16 0.001    
National #1 or #2, not city #1  -0.01 -0.28 0.784    
City #1, not National #1 or #2  -0.08 -0.96 0.338    
NATIND     0.17 2.36 0.019 
NATOVER     -0.05 -0.34 0.732 
NATALONE     0.01 0.09 0.924 
INDNOTNAT     -0.04 -0.34 0.735 
OVERNOTNAT     0.17 1.76 0.078 
F-statistic (p-value)   
  213 
(<.001)   
   182 
(<.001)  
Adjusted R2   0.8   0.8  
Sample Size   n=681   n=681  
*All p-values are two-tail tests 
      
Control Variables      
LTA  =  natural log of total assets, LSUB =  natural log of the number of subsidiaries,  
CATA =  ratio of current assets to total assets,    
Quick =  ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities,  
DE =  ratio of long-term debt to total assets,   
ROI =  ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets,  
Foreign =  proportion of subsidiaries that represent foreign operations,  
Opinion =  indicator variable, 1 = qualified audit report,  
YE =  indicator variable, 1 = non-June 30th year end,   
Loss = indicator variable, 1=loss in any of the past three years.  
Experimental Variables        
NATIND = National #1 or #2, city industry #1 (not overall city #1) 
NATOVER = National #1 or #2, overall city #1 (not city industry #1) 
NATALONE = National #1 or #2 alone, (not overall city #1, or city industry #1)  
INDNOTNAT = City industry #1 (not overall city #1) and not national #1 or #2  
OVERNOTNAT = Overall city #1 (not city industry #1) and not national #1 or #2  
 
